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522 MAGILL BROS. V. BLDG. SERVICE ETC. UNION [20 C. (2d) 
ment in the cases of McKay v. Retail Auto. S. L. Union No. 
106'7, 16 Cal. (2d) 311 [106 P. (2d) 373] j and Steiner v. 
Long Beach Local No. 128, 19 Cal. (2d) 676 [123 P. (2d) 
20], that pickets must act honestly is dictum, and no con-
sideration is given therein to the effect of such statement on 
the right of freedom of speech in relation thereto. The same 
is true of Euclid Candy Co. v. International Longshoremen, 
49 Cal. App. (2d) 137 [121 P. (2d) 91]; Davitt v. American 
Bakers' Union, 124 Cal. 99 [56 Pac. 775]. The same bald 
statement alone is made in Weist v. Dirks, 215 Ind. 568 [20 
N. E. (2d) 969]; Wiltner v. Bless, 243 N. Y. 544 [154N. ,E. 
598] j Olympia Operating Co. v. Costello, 278 Mass. 125 [i79 
N. E. 804] j and no discussion appears with reference to free-
dom of speech in any of these cases. 
Because of my strong conviction that the preservation of 
the fundamental civil liberties of free speech, free press and 
free assembly is essential to the perpetuation of our demo-
cratic institutions, I view with alarm every encroachment 
against the exercise of these rights, whether such encroach-
ment is directed against organized labor or other minority 
groups. If these·rights can be abridged under the guise that 
what is said or published is false, it will just be a matter of 
time until freedom of expression will be curtailed in accord-
ance with the will of the dominant group, who by providing 
the standard as to what constitutes truth or falsity can con-
trol publications of any character whether they be by word 
of mouth, placard, banner or what we now designate as a 
newspaper. 
Furthermore, I am positively and unalterably against any 
form of discrimination in permitting the exercise of the fun-
damental personal rights guaranteed by our federal and state 
Constitutions. These rights are not only guaranteed to those 
who have sufficient power and influence to enforce their rec-
ognition, but like the air and the sunshine their beneficent 
attributes should be shared and enjoyed by the weak and 
humble and those who are struggling for their very exis-
tence. 
I can see no reason whatever why publication of a false 
statement by a labor organization concerning the facts of a 
labor dispute should be subject to abatement by an injunction 
while a newspaper is privileged to publish false statements 
and be subject only to the redress afforded to those who claim 
that they have been libeled by such publication, namely, an 
action at law for damages. 
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In my opinion, the judgment in the case at bar should be 
affirmed. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied July 29, 
1942. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[Sac. No. 5433. In Bank. July 9, 1942.] 
MRS. BEN WHITLOW, as Executrix; etc., Respondent, v. 
CARRIE E. DURST, Appellant. 
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD EM-
PLOYES' MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION (a 
Corporation), Plaintiff, v. CARRIE E. DURST, Appel-
lant; MRS. BEN WHITLOW, as Executrix, etc.,Re-
spondent. 
[la, lb] Divorce-Separation Agreements-Termination-Recon~ 
cilia1:ion-Evidence.-The intention of the parties.is a mate-
rial element in determining whether there has been a recon-
,,'- ciliation between husband and wife. And upon that issue it 
is proper to admit testimony that shortly after the alleged 
reconciliation the husband, since deceased, declared that he 
and his wife were still separated and would never be reconciled. 
[2] Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations as to Intention.-When in-
tent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of 
a decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that 
indicate the intent with whichhe performed the act are admis-
sible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, 
irrespective of whether the declarations are self-serving. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sis-
kiyou County. Herbert S. Gahs, Judge assigned. Affirmed-. 
Actions involving two life insurance policies, one by the 
executrix of the estate of the insured to recover the proceeds 
of a policy paid to his widow, and the other an interpleader 
action by an insurer against the executrix and the widow. 
Judgment for executrix affirmed. 
[2] See 10 Cal. Jur. 1073, 1102. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce and Separation, § 313; 
[2] Evidence, ~ 264, 
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524 WHITLOW v. DURST [20 C. (2d) 
J. Everett Barr, Tebbe & Correia, Samuel Freidman and 
J. P. Correia for Appellant. 
Carter, Barrett & Carlton, Oliver J. Carter and Daniel S. 
Carlton for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In July, 1938, Charles and Carrie Durst 
separated and executed a property settlement under which 
she transferred to him her interest in two insurance policies 
upon his life. He died a month later leaving a will bequeath-
ing the proceeds of the policies to his sister and executrix in 
trust for his mother. . ' j 
Two actions were brought on the policies. In the first the 
executrix seeks to recover from Mrs. Durst the proceeds of 
one policy paid to her by the insurer. The second is brought 
by the other insurer in interpleader, who paid the amount 
of the policy into court. In both actions the executrix claims 
the proceeds under the property settlement and decedent's 
will. Mrs. Durst claims that the agreement was revoked by a 
reconciliation with her husband on July 16, 1938, and that 
decedent made a gift of the policies to her. While several ,vit-
nesses corroborated ber testimony that there had been a re-
conciliation, several other witnesses gave testimony indicating 
that there had been no reconciliation, and her testimony was 
the only evidence of a gift. The trial court r~solved the con-
flict in the evidence and found that there had been no gift 
or reconciliation and entered judgment for the executrix. 
Mrs. Durst appeals. 
[la] There is ample evidence to support the findings of the 
trial court, but appellant urges that the court erroneously ad-
mitted testimony that shortly after the alleged reconciliation 
decedent declared that he and his wife were still separated 
and would never be reconciled. It is argued that these state-
ments were hearsay, self-serving because they were made 
after the alleged reconciliation, and therefore incompetent 
as evidence, and that their admission constituted prejudicial 
error. 
[2] When intent is a material element of a disputed fact, 
declarations of a decedent made after as well as before an al-
leged act that indicate the intent with which he performed the 
act are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay 
rule, and it is immaterial that such declarations are self-serv-
ing. Thus, in cases involving the delivery of deeds, declara-
tions of the alleged grantor made before and after the mak-
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ing of the deed are admissible upon the issue of delivery, and 
it is immaterial that such declarations. are in the interest of 
the party producing them. (Williams ·v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631 , 
[151 Pac. 1, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 703] ; Donohue v. Sweeney, 
171 Cal. 388 [153 Pac. 708] ; De Cou v. Howpll, 190 Cal. 741 
[214 Pac. 444] ; See, McBaine, Admissibility in California of 
Declarations of Physical or Mental Condition, 19 Cal. L. Rev; 
231, 251). Likewise, in gift cases declarations made by the 
grantor before, contemporaneously, and subsequent to the al-
leged gift are admissible-though the statements be self-serving. 
(Sprag~te v. Walton, 145 Cal. 228 [78 Pac. 645].) In aliena-
tion of affections cases declarations of an alienated spouse 
subsequent to the defendant's alleged tortious acts are admis-
sible as evidence of the spouse's state of mind. '(Adkins v. 
Brett, 184 Cal. 252 [193 Pac. 251] ; Cripe v. Cripe, 170 Cal. 91 
[148 Pac. 520].) 
[lb] The intention of the parties is a material element in 
determining whether there has been a reconciliation, between 
husband and wife. (Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36 [255 Pac. 
800] ; Estate of Clover, 179 CaL 313 [176 Pac. 452];Ruggl~s v. 
Bailey, 15 Cal. App. (2d) 555 [59 P. (2d) 837]; Gump v. 
~ Gump,42 Cal. App. (2d) 64 [108 P. (2d) 21].) Declarations 
made by a husband before an alleged dateofre.conciliation 
are admissible ag bearing upon his state of mind and the 
probability of such reconciliation. (Estate of Clover, supra). 
In accordance with the principles set forth, in the foregoing 
cases, declarations made by him a few days after'the 8neged 
reconciliation hag taken place are likewise admissible. 
The case of Carter v. Younger, 123 Ark. 266 [185S. W. 
435], which is contrary to the position here taken, was not 
approved in Estate of Clover, supra, as appellant contends. 
The Clover case involved declarations made before and not 
after an alleged date of reconciliation and the Carter case 
was simply distinguished on that ground. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Ward, 
J., pro tem., concurred. 
Carter, J., did not participate herein. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 6, 
1942. Carter, J., did not participate therein. 
